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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
Case No:  05-2146
KEVIN KELLER;
BENJAMIN MARTIN
      Appellees
     v.
COUNTY OF BUCKS;
MICHAEL FITZPATRICK;
CHARLES MARTIN;
SANDRA MILLER, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS
THE BUCKS COUNTY BD. OF COMMISSIONERS;
ADMINISTRATOR GORDIAN EHRLACHER, INDIVIDUALLY
AND AS DIRECTOR, BUCKS COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH;
LEWIS POLK, MD, MEDICAL DIRECTOR, BUCKS CO.
HEALTH DEPARTMENT, INDIV. AND AS  DIRECTOR OF
CORRECTIONAL HEALTH SVC. (CHS);
JOAN CROWE, R.N., INDIV. AND AS CHS DIRECTOR AT BCCF;
HARRIS GUBERNICK, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS DIRECTOR, BUCKS CO.
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS;
WILLIS MORTON, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS WARDEN,
BUCKS COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
                              County of Bucks;
                              Joan Crowe, RN;
                              Harris Gubernick;
                              Willis Morton,
                                          Appellants
     *The Honorable Joseph E. Irenas, Senior District Judge for the United States District
of New Jersey, sitting by designation. 
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________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
District Court No.: 03-cv-04017
District Judge: The Honorable John P. Fullam
_________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
December 11, 2006
Before: SMITH and ROTH, Circuit Judges,
and IRENAS, District Judge*
(Filed December 22, 2006)
_________________________
OPINION
_________________________
SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
Kevin Keller and Benjamin Martin were pretrial detainees at Bucks County
Correctional Facility during the periods from June 6, 2002 through November 8, 2002,
and August 7, 2001 through September 12, 2001, respectively. Both men contracted a
bacterial infection known as Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus Aureus (MRSA),
which manifested itself during their prison stays, and eventually required that each be
hospitalized. On July 7, 2003, they filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the
county and prison officials and prison personnel (collectively “prison defendants”) were
deliberately indifferent to their legitimate medical needs, maintained unconstitutional
     1Jurisdiction is appropriate in this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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conditions of confinement, and failed to inform them of the dangers of MRSA. After a
five-day jury trial, the jury awarded $800,000 to Keller and $400,000 to Martin in
compensatory damages for pain and suffering. The prison defendants filed a motion for a
new trial and remittitur, which the District Court denied. 
The prison defendants now appeal the rulings of the District Court denying their
motion for a new trial, denying their motion for remittitur, and disallowing the
introduction of impeachment evidence. The three issues presented on appeal are whether
the jury’s findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence, whether the jury’s
award of compensatory damages is excessive such that remittitur is appropriate, and
whether the trial court erred in refusing to allow prior convictions to be introduced into
evidence.1 The appellants seek a new trial. We will affirm the decision of the District
Court.
I. 
The prison defendants claim that a new trial is necessary because the facts do not
show deliberate indifference to a legitimate medical need. Estate of Carter v. City of
Detroit, 408 F.3d 305, 311 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Pre-trial detainees have a right under the
Fourteenth Amendment to adequate medical treatment, a right that is analogous to the
right of prisoners under the Eighth Amendment.”). The standard of review for the denial
of a new trial at issue here is abuse of discretion. Pryer v. C.O. 3 Slavic, 251 F.3d 448,
4453 (3d Cir. 2001) (“We review a district court’s order granting or denying a new trial
for abuse of discretion....”); Black v. Stephens, 662 F.2d 181, 192 n.11 (3d Cir. 1981).
This Court reviews the denial of a motion for a new trial by viewing all of the evidence
and making all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.
Roebuck v. Drexel Univ., 852 F.2d 715, 736 (3d Cir. 1988). 
As a preliminary matter, Keller and Martin contend that the prison defendants
have waived their claim that the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence
because they failed to raise it in the District Court. No waiver occurred here. In their
motion for a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59, which was
expressly incorporated into their amended motion for a new trial, the defendants clearly
noted several ways in which the verdict was contrary to the evidence. See United States v.
Johnson, 302 F.3d 139, 150 (3d Cir. 2002) (“A district court can order a new trial on the
ground that the jury’s verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence only if it believes
that there is a serious danger that a miscarriage of justice has occurred.”).
A. 
To establish a violation of the right to adequate medical care, a plaintiff must show
a serious medical need and acts or omissions by prison officials that indicated a deliberate
indifference to that need. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Rouse v. Plantier, 182
F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). Turning to the evidence, Martin’s testimony showed that he
was promptly seen after he signed up on the sick call sheet for permission to go to the
dispensary regarding a sore on his leg. Martin also said that he saw the doctor a couple of
5days following his initial visit, and the doctor ordered antibiotics for him. Unfortunately,
the antibiotics were penicillin-based, and Martin discovered that he was allergic to them.
His prescription was changed to an antibiotic he could tolerate, but his condition still
worsened. On Sunday evening, Martin’s infected sore began to discharge. Nurse Crowe
only administered Tylenol to him. On Monday morning he visited the prison doctor once
more, and he was sent to Doylestown Hospital for treatment. He subsequently underwent
multiple surgeries. 
Keller testified that he developed bumps under his arms and that he signed up on
the sick call sheet in his cell block for a visit to the dispensary. He further explained that
the sick call sheet was often misplaced, which frustrated his attempts to see a nurse about
his condition.
Keller stated that he attempted to report his problem to a nurse who was
administering nasal swabs to all prisoners. He reported that the nurse told him only to
sign up for sick call. He developed a scrotal infection, and his condition deteriorated.
Keller testified that he signed up for sick call again and asked the block officer for help,
but was told to follow the procedure by signing up for sick call. 
On August 31, he went to the dispensary without having been called and displayed
his infection to the medical staff. A nurse took a culture and he was sent to medical
isolation. Keller testified that the conditions in the medical housing unit were highly
unpleasant, and that he was subjected to the same conditions as inmates who were in
restricted housing due to disciplinary infractions. He stated that he was there for about 36
6hours before he was taken to Doylestown Hospital. Keller testified that upon his return
from the hospital, the scrotal support device he was provided at the hospital was taken
away from him and he was denied bandages for his wound. He was again placed in
medical isolation. 
Keller and Martin argue that the verdicts are not against the weight of the evidence
because the defendants fail to properly acknowledge the facts presented at trial.  Keller
and Martin assert that the evidence clearly showed that they faced a lack of prompt care
for their serious medical needs. The evidence at trial arguably supported both parties’
theories of the case and, based on this record, we do not find any abuse of discretion by
the trial court. Both Martin and Keller’s statements support an inference that the officials
here were both aware of facts from which an inference could be drawn that a substantial
risk of serious harm existed, and they also drew the inference. See Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Thus, it was within the trial court’s discretion to determine that
the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence. 
B. 
The prison defendants also claim that the verdict was against the weight of the
evidence with respect to the conditions of confinement claim. Keller and Martin defend
the verdict on the grounds that Keller’s placement in restricted isolation was devoid of
any rational relationship to a legitimate prison goal or policy, and therefore it amounted
to impermissible punishment. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 165 (3d Cir. 2005)
(“Whether there is a constitutional violation [in a pretrial detention setting] turns on
7whether the disability is imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether it is but an
incident of some other legitimate governmental purpose.”). Keller and Martin also assert
that the verdict is supported by evidence that showed offensive and unsanitary conditions
at the correctional facility. 
Keller and Martin claim that prison defendants are precluded from challenging the
verdict with respect to the conditions of confinement claim because they failed to
challenge the claim in any pretrial motions or at the Rule 50 stage. Keller and Martin are
incorrect; the prison defendants made a motion for judgment as a matter of law at the
close of the evidence. In any event, the failure to move for judgment as a matter of law
does not preclude review on a “weight of the evidence” claim. See Greenleaf v. Garlock,
174 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[T]he position that the court, utilizing its authority
under Rule 59(a), should critically evaluate the evidence and exercise its discretion in
favor of a new trial because the probative evidence in their favor as contrasted with that
opposed is overwhelming ... is not a position that can be taken in support of a Rule 50
motion for judgment as a matter of law.”). Accordingly, Keller and Martins’ waiver
argument is unavailing. 
In order for conditions of confinement to be unconstitutional, they must be shown
to be cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment, and the evidence must reveal
widespread deprivation of the “minimal civilized measures of life’s necessities.” Rhodes
v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981); Suprenant v. Rivas, 424 F.3d 5, 18 (3d Cir. 2005)
(“A pretrial detainee’s claim that he has been subjected to unconstitutional conditions of
     2Keller argues that his isolation was unnecessary because he could have been housed
with other MRSA-infected inmates, and thus, his isolation was punitive. The fact that it
may have been medically acceptable to house Keller with other infected inmates does not
render his isolation unconstitutional. The prison officials had good reason to remove him
from the general prison population, and their decision to house him separately does not
turn their otherwise legitimate exercise of authority into a constitutional violation. 
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confinement implicates Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests. The parameters of such
an interest are coextensive with those of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment.”). With respect to the isolation of Keller, Keller’s
argument overlooks the evidence that Keller testified to, namely, that he was put in the
medical housing unit both before and after his hospitalization. On both occasions, his
isolation immediately followed a medical determination that it was in his interest and the
interest of the prison for him to be removed from the general population.2 
As the U.S. Supreme Court has explained: 
It is perfectly obvious that every decision to remove a particular inmate
from the general prison population for an indeterminate period could not be
characterized as cruel and unusual. If new conditions of confinement are
not materially different from those affecting other prisoners, a transfer for
the duration of a prisoner’s sentence might be completely unobjectionable
and well within the authority of the prison administrator. It is equally plain,
however, that the length of confinement cannot be ignored in deciding
whether the confinement meets constitutional standards. 
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686 (1978) (internal citation omitted). Keller’s testimony
suggests that the conditions he encountered in medical isolation were largely similar to
those to which the general prison population was exposed. The only significant
differences Keller noted between his shared cell block room and the conditions in
9medical isolation were that he was denied canteen privileges, phone access, recreational
privileges, and possession of personal effects such as his girlfriend’s photograph. Keller
was in isolation from September 1 through September 20, 2002, except for the period of
time he spent at the hospital. It seems clear that the additional hardship imposed upon
Keller with respect to the conditions in isolation fell far below a constitutional violation. 
The claim that offensive conditions at the prison created unconstitutional
conditions of confinement presents a more difficult question. The District Court stated
that “[t]he jury also had a more than sufficient basis for concluding that Defendants
through deliberate indifference allowed conditions in the facility that were likely to cause
disease, injury, or suffering.” The Court cited the failure of the prison defendants to take
“necessary steps to minimize the number of inmates affected, for example by keeping the
showers and food handling areas in a sanitary condition and instructing inmates on how
to avoid the spread of infectious diseases.” The fact that conditions were less than
optimal, though, does not establish that they deprived the Keller and Martin of the
minimal civilized measures of life’s necessities merely because they became ill. 
Taken as a whole, and considered under the standard of abuse of discretion, we are
unable to say that the District Court’s opinion with respect to the conditions of
confinement claim is error. The conditions described by Keller and Martin were indeed
distasteful. According to their testimony, filthy water pooled in the showers, water seeped
into the cells, clean laundry was not always readily available, the mattresses were stained,
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and mildew grew on walls covered in peeling paint. Compounding this unpleasantness
was the fact that the inmates were double-celled. 
The Annual Inspection Evaluation Reports for the Bucks County Correctional
Facility for 2001 and 2002 indicate that the chief problems facing the facility were lack
of proper ventilation, a roof in disrepair, mold, peeling paint, and rust. The bedding was
also non-compliant in that the mattresses had cloth covers instead of waterproof covers,
but the reports note that a purchase order had been placed for new, compliant mattresses,
and the roof had been scheduled for repair. The reports made no mention of standing
water in the shower areas or other unhygienic conditions. 
To be sure, the presence of contradictory evidence means only that the jury was
allowed to evaluate that evidence and weigh it as it saw fit. The fact that we do not view
the evidence as being as persuasive as the jury did does not affect the outcome here.
Mindful of the well-established rule that “[a] new trial should be granted only where the
‘great weight’ of the evidence cuts against the verdict and ‘where a miscarriage of justice
would result if the verdict were to stand,’” we are unable to say that a new trial should be
granted. Springer v. Henry, 435 F.3d 268, 274 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting  Sheridan v. E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1076 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc)).
We note that the facts alleged here barely fulfill the minimum requirements of a
conditions of confinement claim, and caution that situations of even slightly lesser
magnitude would likely be an abuse of discretion as a result of improper application of
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law to fact. See Montgomery County v. Microvote Corp., 320 F.3d 440, 445 (3d Cir.
2003) (“An abuse of discretion occurs when “the district court’s decision rests upon a
clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper application
of law to fact.” (quoting Reform Party of Allegheny County v. Allegheny County Dep’t. of
Elections, 174 F.3d 305, 311 (3d Cir. 1999))); see also Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347 (noting
that “cruel and unusual” conditions are adjudged under contemporary standards of
decency); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 (1979) (“Not every disability imposed
during pretrial detention amounts to ‘punishment’ in the constitutional sense, however. ...
[T]he fact that such detention interferes with the detainee’s understandable desire to live
as comfortably as possible and with as little restraint as possible during confinement does
not convert the conditions or restrictions of detention into ‘punishment.’”). 
II. 
Denial of remittitur is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 2660 Woodley Road
Joint Venture v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 369 F.3d 732, 745 (3d Cir. 2004); Brennan v.
Norton, 350 F.3d 399, 431 n.25 (3d Cir. 2003). It is well-established in the Third Circuit
that to disturb a jury verdict, “the damages assessed by the jury must be so unreasonable
as to offend the conscience of the Court.” Motter v. Everest & Jennings, Inc., 883 F.2d
1223, 1230 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149, 152 (3d
Cir. 1979)); Gumbs v. Pueblo Int’l, Inc., 823 F.2d 768, 771 (3d Cir. 1987). Although the
prison defendants are correct that both Keller and Martin made essentially full recoveries,
this fact alone does not require the reduction of the jury’s award. See Gagliardo v.
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Connaught Labs., Inc., 311 F.3d 565, 573 (3d Cir. 2002) (“To recover emotional
damages a plaintiff must show ‘a reasonable probability rather than a mere possibility
that damages due to emotional distress were in fact incurred....’” (quoting Spence v. Bd.
of Educ., 806 F.2d 1198, 1201 (3d Cir. 1986)). There was no abuse of discretion by the
trial court in failing to order remittitur. 
III. 
Review of an evidentiary ruling denying the admission of evidence of prior
convictions for crimes of dishonesty is plenary because the district courts have no
discretion to exclude evidence of a prior conviction under Federal Rule of Evidence
609(a)(2). Walker v. Horn, 385 F.3d 321, 333 n.26 (3d Cir. 2004) (“The construction of
Rule 609 is an issue of law over which we have plenary review.”); United States v. Hans,
738 F.2d 88, 94 (3d Cir. 1984). Keller and Martin renew their waiver argument with
respect to the prison defendants’ claim that impeachment evidence as to Keller should
have been admitted. Keller and Martin argue that the District Court’s ruling on the
pretrial motion in limine excluding the criminal records “as such,” was only tentative and
did not preclude the prison defendants from later making an offer of proof of those
records during trial. Consequently, Keller and Martin claim that because prison
defendants failed to make a later offer, they waived any objection. The critical question is
“whether the district court’s in limine ruling to exclude the [evidence] was ‘a definitive ...
ruling with no suggestion that it would reconsider the matter at trial.’” Walden v.
Georgia-Pacific Corp., 126 F.3d 506, 519 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting American Home
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Assur. Co. v. Sunshine Supermarket, Inc., 753 F.2d 321, 325 (3d Cir. 1985)). 
In ruling on the motion in limine, the following colloquy occurred between the
District Court and defense counsel: 
Ms. Sperling: The criminal records of Mr. Keller and Mr. Martin –
The Court: The records don’t come in, as such. But certainly the fact –
I’ll put it this way. Unless somebody can convince me that
the criminal records bear on the issue of damages, they will
be kept out. 
Ms. Sperling: Thank you, Your Honor.
The Court: I’m advised that we now have a jury panel, so we might as
well not waste anymore [sic] time here. Let’s get the jury. 
Ms. Sperling: Thank you, Your Honor.
Mr. Straw: Thank you, Your Honor. 
The Court: And I will rule on evidentiary matters as they arise in the
course of trial. 
As the plaintiffs suggest, this was not a definitive ruling on the motion in limine, and thus
it was incumbent upon the prison defendants to attempt to make an offer of the records at
trial. See Walden, 126 F.3d at 517 (“Although decisions to exclude evidence are
generally reviewed for abuse of discretion, when a party fails to preserve the right to
appeal an exclusion, we review for plain error. Under Fed. R. Evid. 103(a), a party may
not appeal a ruling excluding evidence unless the party asserting error made an offer of
proof at trial.”). The prison defendants’ argument that the District Court gave them “no
suggestion that it would reconsider [the evidentiary] ruling at trial,” is not credible in
light of the Court’s statement that “I will rule on evidentiary matters as they arise,” and
therefore the prison defendants should have raised the issue again during trial. Id. at 519.
This failure to attempt to introduce the impeachment evidence at trial results in a waiver
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of the issue on appeal. 
IV. 
The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed. Although a different fact
finder may have reached a different conclusion on this record, the verdict reached by this
jury was not against the weight of the evidence. Similarly, the amount of damages
awarded by the jury is not so unreasonable as to require remittitur. As to the evidentiary
ruling, the prison defendants waived this argument by not attempting to put the
impeachment evidence into the record at trial. 
